Human input
The privacy-safe aggregate contains 5 current ratings: 4 team and 1 public. The human mean is 80.0/100. The team has not made a final prioritization decision.
Loading public input and its source labels…
AI assessment: why consider this paper?
The paper elicits forecasts of AI progress and US economic outcomes from academic economists, AI-company employees, AI policy researchers, accurate forecasters and the public, under slow, moderate and rapid AI scenarios. It matters because many policy and investment decisions rest on contested beliefs about AI's economic effects. An evaluation would focus on sample selection and response rates, scenario definitions, and how the forecasts should be interpreted given the groups disagree.
What an expert evaluation could add: Downstream fiscal modeling and monetary-policy commentary show a potential audience, but do not validate the forecast elicitation. An expert can assess the method now, including uncertainty and conversion from capability to economic outcomes. Evidence and commissioning case · AI-governance brief. AI-assisted judgment, 2026-10-07; separate from ratings and completed evaluations.
Additional review resource: AI review workspace: overview, assessments and sources
Brings together the working assessment dated 4 October and the blind 29–30 October run of Joe Francis’s isitcredible suite with Codex (OpenAI GPT). The pages retain their own dates and methods. AI-generated, not checked by a person; not an Unjournal evaluation. Native replication remains access-limited.
AI-generated criterion ratings and reasoning
Scores come from AI prioritization; the accompanying explanations include AI-assisted source checks. These are provisional judgments, separate from human ratings and commissioned evaluations.
Decision relevance
7.0/10
Comparative forecasts of AI's macroeconomic effects inform how funders, think tanks, and policymakers weight AI as a priority and how much credence to place on economist vs. insider vs. superforecaster expectations. It bears on AI-governance resource allocation and on the meta-question of whose forecasts to trust, which matters for GovAI, think tanks, and philanthropic AI-policy funders calibrating expectations of labour, growth, and disruption effects.
- Paper claim to check Median respondents in all five surveyed groups expect substantial AI-driven advances/effects on the U.S. economy. Source abstract
Value of added scrutiny
9.0/10
The clearest downstream use of any paper on our AI list. The Yale Budget Lab built fiscal projections (May 2026) and a tax microsimulation (July 2026) on its forecasts; the Budget Lab is a separate group, though it thanks one coauthor for feedback and had to adjust the productivity inputs to fit its model. Two prominent monetary economists, Cecchetti and Schoenholtz, used its scenarios and variance decomposition to frame advice to the Fed's Productivity and Jobs Task Force on their blog; this is outside commentary, not Fed use, and Cecchetti discloses that he sits on FRI's expert panel. We found no independent critique or review of the method.
Timing
9.0/10
This is a very recent NBER working paper (w35046) with no peer review yet and authors plausibly still seeking feedback, so an independent evaluation is maximally actionable — it could inform revision before publication and provide early public scrutiny of numbers likely to be cited quickly in AI-policy discussions.
- Source record Publication-stage and date evidence should be checked in the linked paper record. NBER
Methodological potential
7.0/10
No methodological rationale is stored.
- Paper claim to check Median respondents in all five surveyed groups expect substantial AI-driven advances/effects on the U.S. economy. Source abstract
Prominence
9.0/10
The scoring model estimated prominence from the paper's venue, authors, institutional setting, and visibility. The model did not supply a criterion-specific explanation. Current public-attention status: Reused in Yale Budget Lab fiscal and tax modeling; used in commentary aimed at the Fed; no independent critique found.
- Policy-analysis use Runs the paper's slow, moderate and rapid scenarios through the Budget Lab's macro model to project GDP, deficits and debt, describing itself as a model-based complement to Karger et al. The Budget Lab revised its inputs on 19 May 2026 because the survey's productivity concept did not match its model, and thanks coauthor Basil Halperin for feedback. Use establishes relevance, not accuracy. Yale Budget Lab, May 2026
Likely influence
7.0/10
The scoring model estimated how far the findings could shape later research or decisions, without supplying a criterion-specific explanation. Current public-attention status: Reused in Yale Budget Lab fiscal and tax modeling; used in commentary aimed at the Fed; no independent critique found. See public-attention evidence below.
- Policy-analysis use Runs the paper's slow, moderate and rapid scenarios through the Budget Lab's macro model to project GDP, deficits and debt, describing itself as a model-based complement to Karger et al. The Budget Lab revised its inputs on 19 May 2026 because the survey's productivity concept did not match its model, and thanks coauthor Basil Halperin for feedback. Use establishes relevance, not accuracy. Yale Budget Lab, May 2026
What the paper says
Source abstract · Full source abstract recovered from the NBER paper page; HTML entities and whitespace normalized.
We elicit forecasts of how AI will affect the U.S. economy, comparing the beliefs of five groups: academic economists, employees at AI companies, policy researchers focused on AI, highly accurate forecasters, and the general public. The median respondent in each group expects substantial advances in AI capabilities by 2030, small declines in labor force participation consistent with demographic shifts, and an annual GDP growth rate of 2.5%, which exceeds both the typical medium-run (2.0%) and long-run (1.7%) baseline forecasts from government agencies and private-sector forecasters. Conditional on a “rapid” AI progress scenario, in which AI systems surpass human performance on many cognitive and physical tasks, experts forecast substantial, though not historically unprecedented, economic shifts: annualized GDP growth rising to around 4% and the labor force participation rate falling from its current level of 62% to 55% by 2050, with roughly half of that decline—equivalent to around 10 million lost jobs—attributable to AI. A variance decomposition suggests that expert disagreement about these effects is driven primarily by different beliefs about the economic effects of highly capable AI systems rather than by disagreement about the pace of AI progress. These forecasts map onto notably different policy preferences across groups: experts strongly favor targeted measures such as worker retraining, whereas the general public supports both targeted programs and broader interventions, including a job guarantee and universal basic income.
Claims to check
- Median respondents in all five surveyed groups expect substantial AI-driven advances/effects on the U.S. economy.
- Beliefs about AI's economic effects differ systematically across academic economists, AI-company employees, AI policy researchers, accurate forecasters, and the general public.
- The paper characterizes which group's expectations are most optimistic/pessimistic and how forecasts diverge on magnitude and timing of AI's economic impact.
Methodological or theoretical issues flagged for evaluation
No structured evaluation-challenges field is stored.
Opus 5.5 re-evaluation (experimental)
Read with care. This is an experimental re-evaluation by a different model (Claude Opus 5.5, 2026-10-01). Across a calibration sample Opus scored about 15 points lower than GPT-5.5, so 15 points are added to compare it with GPT-5.5 scores. The calibration is a small sample (n=44) and is not human-validated, and the two models disagree about the order of papers within the top group. The AI score at the top of this page is the usual evaluation-priority score shifted by the difference between the adjusted Opus score and the earlier holistic score; the synthesis uses that shifted value, and the unshifted score is shown beside it. On the dashboard you can switch the Opus scores off. Read the methods note.
Different reference score. The earlier score for this paper came from an older Opus run (opus), not GPT-5.5, so no +15 offset is applied: the shift is the Opus 5.5 score minus that earlier score, which assumes the two Opus versions share a scale.
Opus rationale (AI-generated)
This NBER working paper from FRI-affiliated researchers (Karger, Kuusela, Abaluck) fits squarely within Unjournal's forecasting and AI-economics remit, two of our stated focus areas. It elicits structured forecasts of AI's effects on US GDP and labour force participation from five groups (academic economists, AI-company staff, AI policy researchers, superforecasters and the public), conditions on an explicit rapid-progress scenario, and links the forecasts to policy preferences. The results matter for how CBO, the Fed and Treasury set long-run growth and labour assumptions. They also matter for debates on retraining versus UBI or job guarantees, and for how funders such as Open Philanthropy, the Sloan Foundation and AI-governance grantmakers decide whether to fund AI-economics modelling, since the variance decomposition says disagreement comes from views about economic effects, not about the pace of progress. It is a recent working paper with no independent public review found, and it is likely to be cited heavily in AI policy discussion. An Unjournal evaluation could add real value by examining sample construction, question framing, how much weight the long-horizon conditional forecasts can bear, and the identification behind the variance decomposition, before the headline numbers ('4% growth', '10 million jobs') harden into talking points. Concerns: this is elicitation of beliefs, not causal evidence about AI's effects, and it is US-only, so its direct global-welfare stakes are more modest than its prominence suggests. Historically, our assessors have been cautious about AI-economics papers, so I'd put this at the top of the 'monitor' band, near the prioritise threshold, rather than a clear 'prioritise now'.
Dashboard details and provenance
Full AI dashboard scoring rationale
This is a fresh NBER working paper eliciting and comparing structured forecasts of AI's effects on the U.S. economy across five distinct populations (academic economists, AI-company employees, AI policy researchers, superforecasters, and the general public). It sits squarely in Unjournal's growing 'economic and social impacts of AI' priority area and overlaps with the forecasting/judgment-aggregation cause area — doubly relevant. The value of evaluation is high: expert-elicitation and forecasting-comparison designs are methodologically subtle (question framing, aggregation choices, selection into groups, calibration/scoring), the results are the kind of headline numbers that get cited quickly in AI-policy debates, and as an unpublished NBER working paper it has not yet had independent peer scrutiny. One of the authors (Ezra Karger) is closely tied to the forecasting-research community, which raises both the paper's likely influence and the case for a genuinely independent read. Main concern: it is an elicitation/survey study rather than a causal empirical estimate, so an evaluator needs to judge the design and interpretation of forecasts rather than an identification strategy — this is evaluable but requires reviewers comfortable with survey/forecasting methodology.
AI decision-relevance rationale
Comparative forecasts of AI's macroeconomic effects inform how funders, think tanks, and policymakers weight AI as a priority and how much credence to place on economist vs. insider vs. superforecaster expectations. It bears on AI-governance resource allocation and on the meta-question of whose forecasts to trust, which matters for GovAI, think tanks, and philanthropic AI-policy funders calibrating expectations of labour, growth, and disruption effects.
AI timing assessment
This is a very recent NBER working paper (w35046) with no peer review yet and authors plausibly still seeking feedback, so an independent evaluation is maximally actionable — it could inform revision before publication and provide early public scrutiny of numbers likely to be cited quickly in AI-policy discussions.
Intake, review, and crux connections
Public attention and use
AI-assisted review of the linked public sources.
Policy-analysis use direct institutional use
Runs the paper's slow, moderate and rapid scenarios through the Budget Lab's macro model to project GDP, deficits and debt, describing itself as a model-based complement to Karger et al. The Budget Lab revised its inputs on 19 May 2026 because the survey's productivity concept did not match its model, and thanks coauthor Basil Halperin for feedback. Use establishes relevance, not accuracy.
Source: Yale Budget Lab, May 2026 · Relationship: separate institution; one coauthor gave feedback
Policy-analysis use direct institutional use
A tax microsimulation that takes growth rates and labor shares from the paper's economist subsample and layers its own GDP, factor-share and distributional assumptions on top.
Source: Yale Budget Lab, July 2026 · Relationship: separate institution
Expert commentary aimed at policy substantial attention
Stephen Cecchetti (Brandeis; formerly head of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department) and Kim Schoenholtz (NYU Stern) build their recommendations to the Fed's Productivity and Jobs Task Force on the paper's three 2030 scenarios and its variance decomposition. This is outside advice to the Fed, not evidence that the Fed uses the paper.
Source: Cecchetti and Schoenholtz blog, 3 Aug 2026 · Relationship: Cecchetti discloses membership of FRI's expert panel
Commentary public mention
Tyler Cowen links the paper with a brief favourable comment.
Source: Marginal Revolution, 1 Apr 2026 · Relationship: independent commentary
Policy roundup public mention
Summarises the paper's results in a weekly research roundup.
Source: Brookings Hutchins Center · Relationship: independent summary
Coauthor institution direct project context
The Chicago Fed issued the paper in its working-paper series. This is a coauthor institution, not independent use.
Source: Chicago Fed · Relationship: coauthor institution
Project page listing / discoverability
FRI hosts the project page and underlying materials.
Source: Forecasting Research Institute · Relationship: author institution
What the search did not establish
- No independent critique of the sampling, weighting or variance decomposition surfaced (searches on 19 Oct 2026).
- No Federal Reserve, CBO or other official document using the forecasts was found; NBER thanks CBO seminar attendees, which shows interest, not use.
- Academic citation is still small: one citing work on OpenAlex (a journal editorial) as of early October.
Targeted search checked 2026-10-19. Search scope: Targeted exact-title searches across the open web, institutional and author pages, news and public social-media results, EA Forum/LessWrong, and policy/white-paper contexts. Evidence records distinguish commissioning or report use from independent discussion, media attention, indexing, and post-publication policy use. A search miss is reported as uncertainty, not proof of absence. Entries with check_depth "quick" rest on roughly one to two searches and should be read as especially uncertain; entries checked on 2026-10-01 were added for the shortlist of papers without human ratings.