AI research review

Research agenda and what to monitor

The framework is not good enough to forecast 2030, but it is good enough to say what to measure now and which extensions would matter most.

Extensions ranked by decision value

Priority
PriorityExtensionWhy it bears on decisionsProposed by
Very highCouple the economic model to endogenous AI-R&D and capability feedbackDetermines transition speed, warning time and whether the 2030 path can accelerate sharply.AI report
Very highReplace the reduced-form capital supply with explicit compute, energy and data-centre investmentCapital supply changes even the sign of the average-wage effect in the extreme scenario (−9.2% at ε = 1, +9.7% at ε = 3). The authors plan to add an Euler equation (footnote 13).AI report
Very highRun a global uncertainty analysis instead of three bundled scenariosShows which uncertain inputs drive policy-relevant outcomes, and stops scenario labels acquiring implicit probabilities.AI report
HighHold the 2030 endpoints fixed and vary shock timingInforms governance lead time and labour-market adjustment capacity.AI report
HighModel richer labour transitions and earnings lossesThe unemployment headline depends on wage rigidity; worker welfare does not. The paper gives movers the new group’s wage at once, with no loss for tenure or skills.AI report
HighMeasure tasks representatively and validate the survey mappingNeeded before survey beliefs can credibly calibrate macro capability.AI report
HighAdd a physical-automation (robotics) blockTests whether non-cognitive occupations are a durable place for displaced workers.AI report
HighModel ownership, taxes, transfers and market powerTurns output and factor-share results into welfare and distribution questions.AI report
HighFeed expert forecasts (such as Karger et al.) through the model and compare with the survey-implied scenariosShows where expert and public expectations differ in their implications.Earlier AI assessment
HighDecompose the scenario gaps input by input, including posting speed θH and the search discount μThe named scenarios move seven inputs together; one of them, faster vacancy posting, cushions the disruptive cases.Claude
Medium-highModel international trade, adoption and capital ownershipNeeded before treating a US transition model as a global-priorities model.AI report
Medium-highCheck survey nonresponse: compare the 3,259 complete responders with the full sample, and imputeComplete-case results may differ from the representative sample.Earlier AI assessment

Priorities are the AI report’s, except rows proposed by the earlier AI assessment or by Claude .

The paper’s own sensitivity tables already show why joint uncertainty matters more than one-at-a-time checks. A world with heavy automation, no new tasks, scarce capital, sticky wages and poor matching across occupations differs in kind from one with the same AI capability but abundant capital and flexible institutions. A useful next version of the explorer would replace “which of three stories are we in?” with an ensemble view: distributions over inputs, their correlations, the resulting spread of outcomes, and which inputs account for most of that spread. The named scenarios could stay as landmarks.

What to monitor now

Waiting for aggregate unemployment would be a mistake. A better monitoring system tracks these together.

Block
ObservableModel input it informsPossible decisionExample current evidence
Representative task capabilitym, aUpdate economic-transition and safety scenariosNone recorded here
Actual workplace usagedDistinguish technical capability from the realised shockMassenkoff & McCrory, Labor market impacts of AI: a new measure and early evidence
Autonomous versus assistive useψAssess displacement pressureAppel et al., Anthropic Economic Index report: Uneven geographic and enterprise AI adoption (the paper’s source for ψ: about half automation on Claude.ai, three-quarters on the API); later: March 2026 report
New human tasks and occupationsρAssess whether new tasks offset automationNone recorded here
Entry-level hiring and wage growth by exposureξ, μ, θHTrigger a review of training, wage insurance or income supportMassenkoff & McCrory, Labor market impacts of AI: a new measure and early evidence
Time to move between occupations, and earnings lostμ, θHSize transition assistance and social insuranceNone recorded here
Compute prices, construction pipelines and electricity constraintsεUpdate who captures the productivity gains, and how quicklyNone recorded here
Robot capability against robot cost ClaudeOutside the model (physical automation)Judge whether other occupations stay a safe destinationLegate-Yang & Massenkoff, What work can robots do?
AI’s contribution to AI researchOutside the model (AI-R&D feedback)Update governance lead time separately from labour-market signalsChan et al., What If Automating AI R&D Triggers an Intelligence Explosion?
Expectations of the public, experts and lab staff ClaudeScenario choiceShow how far beliefs about the inputs divergeSacher, Cotter, Jones, Korinek & McCrory, The AI expectations gap

Rows from the AI report; the robot-cost and expectations rows and the evidence column were added by Claude . Evidence links show that a measurement exists, not that it settles the question.

AI’s contribution to AI research needs its own trigger system. The macro model cannot tell decision-makers when an acceleration has begun, because that mechanism sits outside it. Economic-policy monitoring and safety monitoring should be linked but kept distinct (Chan et al., 2026) .

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